1 Introduction.
In this paper, I show that a policy aimed at providing liquidity to banks in emergency situations can prevent bank panics without creating moral hazard. There is a long-held belief that banks are inherently unstable and may be subject to panics or runs. The traditional answer to the problem of bank panics has been to introduce a deposit insurance scheme; the FDIC in the U.S. is an example. Since the 1980's, deposit insurance schemes in general, and the FDIC in particular, have come under much criticism as they are thought to create moral hazard (see for example Kareken and Wallace (1978) or Boyd and Rolnick (1988) ).
The intuition is standard from insurance theory. Since deposit insurance shields banks from the negative consequences of the risk that they may take, but not from the benefits, they will take excessive risk 1 .
In this paper, I examine a different kind of policy intended to prevent bank panics. This policy, which can be traced back at least to Bagehot (1873) , consists of providing liquidity to banks in a period of panic. The idea is that a panic can be prevented if banks can obtain enough money to accommodate withdrawals without needing to liquidate illiquid assets. Thus, Bagehot (1873) writes: "Theory suggests, and experience proves, that in a panic the holders of the ultimate Bank reserve ... should lend to all that bring good securities quickly, freely, and readily." I will show that the type of policy advocated by Bagehot works. Not only are panics prevented, but the moral hazard problem is avoided because the policy does not affect the return of the banks in an asymmetric way. They are not bailed out if the risky projects in which they invested fail.
To think seriously about how to prevent bank panics without moral hazard, one needs a model with three important features: 1) bank runs can occur as an equilibrium phenomenon, 2) moral hazard is possible and, 3) money is needed. To do this, I adapt a model of the type introduced by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) (DD). I allow for risky technologies so that moral hazard can occur and I add a cash-in-advance constraint in order to introduce money. A contribution of this paper is to introduce money into this type of model 2 . This is important 1 Several authors have proposed ways to modify deposit insurance scheme that mitigate the moral hazard problem. See for example Boyd and Rolnick (1988) , Feldman and Rolnick (1997) , Calomiris (1999) , Chen (1999) . 2 Champ, Smith, and Williamson (1996) , Williamson (1998) also introduce money in a model of banking.
In these models deposit insurance cannot prevent bank panics, thus they are unable to answer the questions I ask in this paper.
because it permits the analysis of a new class of policies.
I compare a deposit insurance policy with a liquidity provision policy. I show that although the former policy does a good job at preventing bank runs, it also leads to moral hazard. I consider a repurchase policy that resembles the one advocated by Bagehot (1873) . I show that it prevents bank runs and, more importantly, that it doesn't create a moral hazard problem. The deposit insurance policy affects the banks' payoffs in an asymmetric way.
When the investment of a bank is successful, the bank keeps all of the proceeds, whereas if it fails, the bank is bailed out. This leads the bank to take on more risk than it would in the absence of the deposit insurance policy. I show that reducing the amount of insurance provided can decrease the moral hazard problem. The repurchase policy eliminates the moral hazard problem. There are three important elements in Bagehot's proposed policy 3 . 1) Loans
should be made at a high interest rate, 2) they should be made freely, and 3) they should be made on all good securities. In my model loans will be made at an interest rate of zero, but this shouldn't be surprising since there are no alternative uses for the funds the central bank lends. These loans are made freely, and the model makes precise what should be understood by "good securities". There is one important aspect of the policy that doesn't appear in Bagehot (1873) , it is that the central bank should have priority over the assets of the banks it has made loans to. This is necessary to avoid moral hazard. With this policy in place, banks obtain money when they need it by selling illiquid assets to a monetary authority.
They must buy these assets back after the threat of a panic has passed or declare bankruptcy.
Consequently they incur the full cost when their investments fail. The incentives of the bank are thus unaffected by the repurchase policy and the moral hazard problem is avoided.
The ingredients of the model are very standard. The basic structure is that of DD and, to keep things as simple as possible, I assume that there is no aggregate uncertainty 4 . The need for money is motivated by a cash-in-advance constraint as in Lucas and Stokey (1987) .
My paper is related to two branches of the literature, on the one hand some authors have analyzed deposit insurance schemes, on the other hand, some have looked at liquidity provi- insurance and show that it is possible to provide insurance for banks subjected to privately observed liquidity shocks. Cooper and Corbae (2000) show that liquidity provision by a central bank can help avoid financial panics.
The rest of the paper goes as follows. In the next section, I present the model. At first I do not allow risky technologies so that moral hazard cannot be a problem. In sections 3,4, and 5, I present the households, the firms, and the banks' problems, respectively. In section 6, I define a stationary equilibrium for this model. In section 7, I present the efficient allocation as well as some important related results. In sections 8 and 9, I describe a deposit insurance policy and a repurchase policy and show that they both prevent bank panics. Then, in section 10, I allow risky technologies and show that the deposit insurance policy creates moral hazard.
I also show that the repurchase policy doesn't. Section 11 concludes.
There is a continuum of households, of banks and of firms, each of mass 1, which live forever.
There is one type of good at each date, denoted by c. Each date t = 0, 1, 2, ... contains four sub-periods: j = 0, 1, 2, 3.
Endowments
Each household has an endowment of money M at date zero. Also, at every date, every household is endowed with an amount ω c of good c in sub-period 0. No endowment is received in the other sub-periods. Banks and firms do not receive an endowment.
Technologies
There are two investment technologies available only to firms and households:
1) The short-term (storage) technology yields 1 unit of good c in sub-period j for each unit invested in sub-period j − 1, j = 1, 2.
2) The long-term technology yields R > 1 units of good c in sub-period 2 for each unit invested in sub-period 0. It is assumed that liquidating the long-term technology in subperiod 1 carries a cost in terms of good c and returns only r < 1. For example, assume that a proportion l of the unit invested is liquidated in sub-period 1, then the technology has return rl in that sub-period and (1 − l)R in sub-period 2.
These technologies are standard in this type of model and are very similar to the technologies in DD.
There is no technology that allows goods to be transferred from one date to the next.
Hence the amount of goods available at each date is always the same. The distribution of money holdings could vary from date to date, but I will restrict my attention to stationary equilibria so that the problem faced by each agent at each date is the same.
Preferences
Households can be of two types: the impatient type only derives utility from consumption in sub-period 1, and the patient type derives utility only from consumption in sub-period 2. Types are learned at the beginning of sub-period 1 and are private information. Each household has a probability θ > 0 of being of type 1 and it is assumed that a law of large number holds so that the proportion of type 1 households in the population is θ. Let c j , denote the amount of good c consumed in sub-period j. A household's expected utility in every period is:
If households are impatient, they only want to consume good c in sub-period j = 1 and if they are patient, they only want to consume good c in sub-period j = 2. 5 These preferences are also standard in this type of model and are very similar to the preferences assumed by DD.
I assume that u is CRRA:
Moreover, I assume (as does all the literature) that σ > 1. 
Cash-in-advance constraint
In order to have a role for money I impose a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint on the purchase of consumption goods by the households. Specifically, at least α ∈ (0, 1) of each dollar a household spends on goods must be cash. The remainder (no more that 1 − α) can be either cash or deposits from the banks.
Sunspot
I assume that with probability µ a sunspot appears. I will restrict my attention to equilibria where households have the following beliefs: when the sunspot appears, everyone believes that all households will claim to be impatient; otherwise everyone believes that all households report their true type. 5 The analysis can be extended to more general preferences as shown by Jacklin (1987) or Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) . 6 In the original DD model, this assumption means that the impatient households consume more if they have access to the bank than they do in autarky. In that sense, banks are providing liquidity.
Timing
The timing of events at each date is as follows:
Sub-period 0 (Contracting):
1) Households meet banks. Households deposit their endowments and obtain deposit contracts from the banks.
2) Banks meet firms. Banks can loan the goods they bought from the households to the firms.
Sub-period 1 (Early withdrawal):
1) Households learn their type, households and banks observe whether or not a sunspot appears.
2) Households who claim to be impatient meet banks. These households can withdraw cash and claims on the goods produced by the firms.
3) Same households meet firms. The same households can then buy goods from the firms.
Sub-period 2 (Late withdrawal):
1)
Households who claim to be patient meet banks. These households can withdraw cash and claims on the goods produced by the firms.
2) Same households meet firms. The same households can then buy goods from the firms.
Sub-period 3 (Wrapping up):
1) Banks meet firms. Banks that have claims on the cash held by the firms can obtain it.
2) Banks meet households. Households that have claims on the cash held by the banks can obtain it.
The purpose of sub-period 3 is to make sure that the households end the period with cash.
At the end of sub-period 2, firms hold all the cash, but they have no use for it. They thus sell claims on this cash to the banks who, in turn, sell claims on that cash to the household.
Contracts
Assumption 2.1. All contracts must be nominal.
Let S = {0, 1} denote the set of states of the economy (the state is 1 if a sunspot occurs and 0 otherwise), and X = (
All contracts are written in sub-period 0. Contracts in this economy specify a triple (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) indicating the number of dollars paid in sub-periods 1, 2, or 3, respectively, if the contract is executed in that sub-period, and a number γ, the minimum proportion of cash to be given when the contract is executed. They can be functions of the state of the economy. The importance of this restriction was first pointed out by Jacklin (1987) . He showed that without assumption 2.5, there would be a market for deposit contracts in sub-period 1. With 7 In the US, suspension of convertibility has always been illegal for individual banks. On some occasions, at the end of the 19th century and in the beginning of the 20th, banks have been allowed to jointly suspend convertibility. I do not want to consider that here and assume that suspensions are not allowed.
the preferences that I have assumed, allowing this market yields the efficient allocation. However, Jacklin (1987) also showed that with more general preferences the allocation obtained when assumption 4 is imposed yields strictly more utility than the allocation when it is not imposed. This point is also discussed in Haubrich and King (1990) and von Thadden (1999).
Without loss of generality, I can limit myself to the following contracts 8 :
Contracts offered by the banks:
Cash-for-next-period contract: (0, 0, 1), γ = 1.
Contract offered by the firms:
Firm-contract 1, goods in j = 1 if s = 0:
Firm-contract 2, goods in j = 2 if s = 0: otherwise. FC4 will never be used if there are bank panics when the sunspot appears.
The households' problem
A household chooses how much to deposit in the banks and which type (patient or impatient)
to announce in order to maximize its utility. In this model, households will always choose to deposit all of their resources in the banks, since the banks provide partial insurance to the household against the risk of being impatient.
Impatient households always report their type truthfully since consuming in sub-period 2 has no value to them. Patient households, on the other hand, may announce that they are impatient, obtain goods from the firms and store them until the next sub-period. As is standard in this type of model, the announcement of a patient household depends on what it believes other patient households will announce. If it believes that all households will announce their true type, it optimally chooses to do so as well. Indeed, in this case patient households get to consume more goods than impatient ones. On the other hand, if it believes that all households will claim to be impatient, it is better off claiming to be impatient. This is because if all other households claim to be impatient, the firms must liquidate all the investment made in the long-term technology and there will be no goods left over for the household announcing it is patient. I associate the event of all household claiming to be impatient with a bank panic.
I denote by c 1 and c 2 the consumption of households who claim to be impatient and patient, respectively, when there is no sunspot. The price of both is denoted by p n . I denote by c s the consumption of all households when there is a sunspot. The price is p s .
A household's budget constraint is
where W 1 , W M are the quantities of deposit contracts and cash-for-next-period contracts, respectively, that the household buys, p is the price the bank pays for one unit of the household's endowment. The amount of contracts a household has limits the value of the goods it can buy, so that:
Combining these constraints (which hold at equality), one can see that the household solves the following dynamic problem:
The first constraint is simply the budget constraint. The second one says that the value of the consumption when there is a sunspot is the same as the value of the consumption of impatient households when there is no sunspot. This simply comes from the fact that when there is a sunspot, all households claim to be impatient. The third constraint says that households who claim to be patient receive more dollars that household who claim to be impatient.
From the first order conditions and the envelope condition, one gets
In a stationary equilibrium, M = M and p = p so that the last condition implies
The firms' problem
A firm buys some good c from the banks in exchange for nominal contracts promising the bank goods in sub-periods 1 and 2 and cash in sub-period 3 (by symmetry, all firms end up with an amount ω c of good c). Let N 1 , N 2 , N s , N M denote the quantities of firm-contracts 1, 2, 3, and cash-for-next-period contracts, respectively, that the firm sells, and i 1 and i 2 denote the amount invested in the short-term and the long-term technology, respectively. A firm chooses the amount of contracts it sells, the amount of goods it buys and how to invest these goods in order to maximize its profits. Thus it solves
The first constraint is the resource constraint. The second and third constraints indicate that a firm must make enough sales to satisfy the claims bought by the banks in the case there is no sunspot. The fourth constraint concerns the case where there is a sunspot. From the binding CIA constraints presented in the banks' problem below, it can be seen that
Notice that the objective function of the firm, as well as the constraints, are linear. I want to consider interior solutions; conditions for such a solution are
The banks' problem
A bank is involved in transactions both with households and with firms. As described earlier, a bank sells contracts to households in exchange for money and goods (again by symmetry, all banks end up with an amount ω c of good c),
The bank in turn sells these goods to the firms in exchange for nominal claims on the goods and money generated by the firms,
give to impatient and patient households, respectively. The bank must have enough cash and goods to pay the households when they decide to withdraw. These constraints are:
The first constraint applies when there is a sunspot. The next two are for impatient and patient households, respectively, when there is no sunspot. The last constraint assures that the bank has enough cash in sub-period 3.
A bank chooses the amount of contracts it sells to households, the amount of contracts it buys from firms, and how much money to set aside for patient and impatient households in order to maximize its profits. It is worth noting that since banks are perfectly competitive, they must offer contracts that maximize the expected utility of the households. Taking into account the fact that ρ M = q M = β from the households' problem, and that all the above constraints hold with equality, one can write the problem that banks must solve as
s.t.
The first constraint is the CIA constraint in the case there is a sunspot. Since all households claim to be impatient, the bank need not keep M 2 until sub-period 2. The next two constraints are the CIA constraints in the case there is no sunspot. Here also, the objective function and the constraints are linear and I look for an interior solution. Since λ ≥ 1, the second and third constraints bind, but not the first one. Thus,
At this time, it is interesting to note the following:
Proof. Under the above hypothesis, M 2 / (1 − θ), the amount of cash the bank has set aside for patient households, is bigger than (N 1 + M 1 ) /θ = W 1 , the amount of dollars that the bank must pay households which claim to be impatient. Thus the bank can pay patient households claiming to be impatient without having to ask the firm to liquidate the longterm technology. But this in turn implies that patient households are strictly better off revealing their true type.
To keep the analysis interesting, I assume that M 2 / (1 − θ) < (N 1 + M 1 ) /θ. According to the following lemma, this means that α must not be too close to 1.
Lemma 5.2. There exists α sufficiently small such that
Proof. As noted above,
This means that
Thus as α decreases, M i becomes smaller compared to N i . Thus there is α sufficiently small
Note that W 1 and λ might change as α changes, however, λ ≥ 1 and W 1 is bounded away from zero as α decreases.
Equilibrium
I can now define a stationary equilibrium.
Definition 6.1. Given ω c , M, r, R, µ, a stationary equilibrium is a set of prices
and an allocation
1) Given prices, the allocation solves the problem of the households, the banks and the firms.
2) Markets clear:
It is possible to obtain equations that completely characterize an equilibrium for this model. They are given in the appendix. I can show the following result:
Proposition 6.2. There exists an equilibrium for this economy. For small values of µ bank panics occur in equilibrium.
The proof is in the appendix.
The efficient allocation
The efficient allocation is obtained by maximizing the utility of a representative household, subject to the resource constraints. It solves the following problem:
The solution to this problem is characterized by
Proposition 7.1. If µ = 0 the equilibrium allocation is the efficient allocation (with probability 1).
Corollary 7.2. For any µ, if announcing their true type is an optimal strategy for the households, then the equilibrium allocation is efficient.
Suppose that a policy is put in place that makes it optimal for all households to announce their true type (the deposit insurance and repurchase policies that I introduce below are examples of such policies). Then the corollary tell us that the efficient allocation can be obtained as a unique competitive equilibrium. This is because households now disregard the sunspot. Their beliefs over other households actions have no effect on their own behavior.
If µ > 0 and there is no policy that makes it optimal for all households to always reveal their true type, there are infinitely many equilibria that are not efficient. Even if the sunspot never occurs (this happens with probability zero) the equilibrium is not efficient, because in choosing how much to invest in each technology, the firm takes into account the fact that µ > 0 and thus the investment choice is different from the efficient investment.
In the rest of the paper, I assume that µ > 0 and consider two different policies aimed at preventing bank runs. The first one, which I call deposit insurance, guarantees that there will always be enough goods for the households that claim to be patient. The second one, which I call repurchase policy, allows a central bank to buy assets held by the banks, providing them with more liquidity. Each policy will be presented in more detail below.
I will show that, in this model, both policies prevent bank runs, which is enough to make the resulting equilibrium efficient. Later I will enrich the model and allow firms to invest in long-term projects with different risk characteristics. In this richer model, preventing bank panics is not sufficient to obtain the efficient allocation. I will show that although the deposit insurance policy still prevents bank runs, it also creates moral hazard, and the resulting equilibrium is not efficient. On the other hand, the repurchase policy prevents bank runs without creating moral hazard, resulting in a efficient equilibrium.
In this section, I will describe the deposit insurance policy and show how it prevents bank runs. To do this, I will show that under this policy, the patient households prefer to announce their type truthfully, even if they believe that all other households will claim to be impatient.
I assume that there is an insurance authority (IA) which is allowed to tax the good c held by households in sub-period 0 and invest it in the long-term technology. The IA can then distribute these goods to households in sub-period 2. The IA does not observe the sunspot 9 .
At the beginning of sub-period 2, a bank can declare bankruptcy or stay in business. If it declares bankruptcy, the bank must hand over all its assets to the IA, which distributes the goods to the patient depositors of the bank.
Note that if there is no limit to the amount the IA can tax, it can eliminate the role of the banks by taxing exactly the amount that banks would want to invest in the long-term technology. In that case, banks always declare bankruptcy in sub-period 2 and the IA distribute the goods it has to patient households. To avoid that I assume that there is a cap on the amount the IA is allowed to tax.
The timing, in sub-period 2, is as follows:
1) Banks announce whether or not they are bankrupt.
2) Bankrupt banks hand over their goods to the IA.
3) The IA chooses a tax τ and distributes goods to patient depositors of bankrupt banks.
The IA gives goods from the deposit insurance fund to patient households whose banks Proof. Let me first explain the meaning of x. Assume that firms have invested in the short and long-term technologies as under the efficient allocation. Then x is the maximum number of households that can receive an amount of consumption c 1 in sub-period 1 such that there will be enough goods available in sub-period 2 for the remaining household to also consume c 1 . Formally,
indicates that a mass x of household can receive c 1 , in sub-period 1, if i 1 has been invested in the short-term technology, τ has been taxed and (ω c − τ − i 1 ) has been invested in the long-term technology and liquidated. The amount taxed will be enough to provide c 1 , in sub-period 2, to the remaining 1 − x households if
Eliminating τ in these two equations yields the value of x given above. Note that x ≥ θ.
Now consider the worse case scenario where all banks are subjected to a panic and must declares bankruptcy. If exactly x − θ patient households go to the bank in sub-period 1, they will receive c 1 and there will be no goods left in the firms. However, the IA will have just enough goods to give c 1 to the 1 − x remaining patient households. If less than x − θ patient households go to the bank in sub-period 1, they still get c 1 , but now there are goods leftover in the firms. Because each unit not liquidated in sub-period 1 yields R units in sub-period 2, the other patient households will receive more that c 1 . If more that x−θ patient household go to the bank in sub-period 1, they will each receive less than c 1 . The other patient households will receive more that c 1 because there is less that 1−x households to give goods to. It follows that a patient household can never be better off going to the bank in sub-period 1. This will remain true if only some banks are subject to panics because there will be less households needing goods. This completes the proof.
Thus, in sub-period 2, along the equilibrium path, patient households receive c 2 − the equilibrium path, they might receive as little as zero from the bank, but they know that, if this is the case, they will receive at least c 1 from the insurance authority. In any case, they will never consume less that c 1 . The equilibrium allocation with deposit insurance is thus efficient; it is also unique.
Repurchase policy
Now I describe the repurchase policy and show that it also prevents bank runs. Here I assume that there is a central bank (CB) that can buy assets held by the banks in sub-period 1 and sell these assets back in sub-period 2. Specifically, I assume that the asset the CB repurchases is the cash-for-next-period contract the banks bought from the firms; that is, claims on $1 to be delivered by a firm in sub-period 3. The CB sets the prices at which it buys and sells the assets. The banks can then use the extra amount of cash they obtain to pay the households which announce that they are impatient without having to liquidate the long-term technology.
This implies that there will be enough goods left for patient households in sub-period 2.
At the beginning of sub-period 2 a bank can declare bankruptcy. If it does, its assets are handed over first to the central bank, to repay the loans it has made, and only then to the depositors. The fact that the CB has priority over the assets of the bank will play an important role in the next section when I introduce risky technologies. If the bank does not declare bankruptcy, it must first buy its assets back from the CB and then it serves depositors.
Notice that all banks are allowed to transact with the CB. Hence this policy does not help any bank in particular, but instead offers liquidity to all. As was the case for deposit insurance, I assume that the CB doesn't observe the sunspot.
The timing, in sub-period 1, is as follows:
1) The banks and households (but not the CB) observe the sunspot.
2) Each bank decides if it wants to sell assets to the CB.
2) If a bank is bankrupt, the CB first repays itself and then the depositors obtain what is left.
3) If a bank stays in business, it buys its assets back form the CB and then pays patient depositors.
The intuition for how this policy work is similar to the case described above when
If the bank can always pay all impatient households without needing to liquidate the long-term technology, then the patient households don't have an incentive to pretend to be impatient. There are two differences between the deposit insurance and the repurchase policy, one is how they operate (redistributing goods or injecting cash) and the other is when they operate (cash is injected in sub-period 1 while goods are give to patient depositors in sub-period 2).
Thus, one might wonder what would happen if the IA was able to print money. It is easy to see that being able to print money is not useful for the IA. Indeed, giving cash to patient household will not allow them to consume more if there are no goods available. Similarly, allowing the CB to tax and distribute goods isn't helpful. The problem in this model is that there might be too many depositors asking for goods in sub-period 1. By distributing goods in that sub-period, the CB can only make things worse.
Moral hazard
An important criticism of policies aimed at insuring banks is that they may lead to moral hazard problems. In the model as it stands, there can be no moral hazard because the technologies available to the firms are not risky. In this section, I introduce risky long-term technologies and consider the two policies described above in this new context. I will show that although both policies can still prevent bank runs, they have very different implications in terms of moral hazard. In particular, deposit insurance leads to moral hazard whereas the repurchase policy does not. This is because the deposit insurance policy bails out banks when risky projects fail. On the other hand, the repurchase policy doesn't affect the payoff of the banks and thus doesn't modify their incentives.
Assume that long-term projects are indexed by z, z ∈ [1, ∞), and yield Q(z)R in subperiod 2 for each unit invested in sub-period 0, where Q(z) is equal to z with probability 1/z and 0 with probability (z − 1)/z. Assume that z ≤ Z, for some big enough Z. This technology is also assumed to be illiquid and yields r per unit invested if liquidated at date 1. The actual value taken by Q(z), for each project, is observed by the banks and households at the beginning of sub-period 2 and the Q(z) are independent between projects. I assume that the Insurance Authority and the Central Bank can observe neither the choice of z nor the realization of Q(z) 10 .
Notice that the illiquid technology assumed until now is a special case of this technology with z = 1. The risky technologies are mean preserving spreads of the riskless technology.
The expected return of these technologies is R regardless of the value of n, but the technology is riskier for higher values of z. I will restrict my attention to the case where all banks are symmetric and choose the same z, and I will usez to denote that level.
I assume that when a bank and a firm meet in sub-period 0, they agree on the z the firm will choose. For this reason I can say that z is chosen by the bank. It is interesting to note that without deposit insurance or repurchase policy, banks choose z = 1. Now I consider the effect of deposit insurance in this environment.
Deposit insurance with risky technologies
The policy is the same as above. The timing, in sub-period 2, is as follows:
1) Banks observe the realization of Q (z).
2) Banks announce whether or not they are bankrupt.
3) Bankrupt banks hand over their goods to the IA.
4) The IA chooses a tax τ and distributes goods to patient depositors of bankrupt banks.
As before, τ = (1 − x) c 1 /R and the deposit insurance fund is distributed among patient households whose banks have declared bankruptcy until these households have as much as the other patient households or the fund is exhausted. Any remainder is distributed equally among all patient households. Now I show that deposit insurance leads to moral hazard.
Proposition 10.3. With deposit insurance, it is optimal for banks to choose z > 1.
Proof. Suppose, on the contrary, that all banks choose z = 1 and consider the case of a bank who wants to deviate. Since the insurance fund contains (1 − x) c 1 and none of the other banks will declare bankruptcy, the patient households in the deviating bank are guaranteed to consume at least c 2 . If their bank's project fail and it must declare bankruptcy they will get exactly that amount (recall that each bank has measure zero) and they will get more if the project succeeds. Thus the utility of the patient households in this bank is:
Taking derivatives with respect to z and using the fact that u is CRRA, one gets −σu z c 2 − . On the other hand, if it does not declare bankruptcy, which happens with probability I can find the choice of z that maximizes this function by taking the derivative with respect to z and setting it equal to zero. Once again using the fact that u is CRRA, I obtain:
Set z =z in the above equation to get the equilibrium value of z.
Under deposit insurance, patient households consume a different amount depending on whether or not their bank declares bankruptcy, this means that the utility of these households is lower that it would be under the efficient allocation. This is true despite the fact that the total amount of goods consumed in this economy is independent of the choice of z (recall that the risky technologies are mean preserving spreads of the riskless one). Obviously, the cost of deposit insurance would be greater if the expected value of the risky project was lower than that of the riskless projects.
Deposit insurance prevents bank runs and thus guarantees a unique equilibrium. However, this equilibrium can be really bad. Banks take on too much risk and many fail. For µ sufficiently small, the cost of moral hazard will exceed the cost of bank runs making the deposit insurance policy harmful.
It should be noticed that it is possible to mitigate the moral hazard problem by reducing the amount of insurance provided by the IA. Suppose, to take an extreme example, that the IA gives goods to the patient household of a bank up to the point where their consumption is c 1 , but no more. The rest of the deposit insurance fund is distributed equally among the patient depositors of the other banks. This means that there is no redistribution between banks and patient households are punished if their bank declares bankruptcy. In this case the banks have no incentives to choose z > 1. However, is not clear that the policy just described looks anything like a deposit insurance policy. In fact, is equivalent to a capital requirement that forces the banks to invest a fixed amount in the riskless technology but provides no insurance.
Repurchase policy with risky technologies
The policy is the same as it was before. The timing, in sub-period 1, is as follows:
3) If a bank is bankrupt, the CB first repays itself and then the depositors obtain what is left.
4) If a bank stays in business, it buys its assets back form the CB and then pays its patient depositors.
This policy prevents bank runs for exactly the same reasons as in the model where the long-term technology is not risky. What is important however is that it doesn't lead to moral hazard. Here, the fact that the CB has priority of the assets of the banks if it declares bankruptcy is very important. Proof. Notice that this policy prevents bank runs by giving banks enough cash to pay out the household claiming to be impatient. It doesn't change the amount of goods available for households claiming to be patient. Also notice that the choice of z by other banks has no influence on the amount of goods available to a bank. Since households are risk averse, and the long term technology has the same expected return for all z, but is riskier the bigger z is, banks choose to minimize the risk and set z = 1.
Absent the priority rule, this policy might not prevent moral hazard. If a bank chooses a high z and gets a bad realization of Q (z), it might want to pay out the cash it has on hand to the patient household and declare bankruptcy, leaving the CB with assets worth very little.
With the priority rule, however, the patient depositors only get paid after the CB. This gives them the incentive to deposit in banks that choose low values of z.
Notice that this policy works even though the CB doesn't observe z, and the realization of Q (z). The timing here is important; if Q (z) were observed by banks in sub-period 1, this policy wouldn't be able to prevent bank runs. This is because all patient agents would claim to be impatient when the technology has low return. Banks have information that the CB doesn't have as they observe z and Q (z), but the repurchase policy will still work if Q (z) is observed in sub-period 2. One can think of a situation where the return of the technology is observed early as having more information asymmetry as when it is observed late. The model then suggests that what Bagehot means when he talks of "good securities" is securities where this asymmetry isn't too big. Indeed, it is not the riskiness of the securities that matters, the repurchase policy would still work in an environment where banks optimally invest in risky technologies.
11 Conclusion.
In this paper I showed that a repurchase policy can prevent bank runs without causing moral
hazard. In order to analyze such a policy, one must first have a model in which bank runs can occur in equilibrium and money is needed. I do this by adding a cash-in-advance constraint to a Diamond and Dybvig (1983) type model.
As a benchmark case, I considered a stylized deposit insurance policy, where all deposits are completely insured. I show that in the context of the model, this policy does prevent bank runs, as does the repurchase policy. If moral hazard is not a problem, both policies implement the efficient allocation. If, however, moral hazard is a problem, the deposit insurance policy does not perform nearly as well as the repurchase policy. Under the deposit insurance policy, banks are bailed out when their risky investments fail and that gives them incentive to take on more risk than they would otherwise. This is not the case with the repurchase policy, because it doesn't affect the banks' return in an asymmetric way.
The analysis of this paper suggests that instead of trying to reform deposit insurance to mitigate the moral hazard problem that it creates, one could consider a different kind of policy. Policies of the type advocated by Bagehot (1873) and modelled in this paper should be considered a serious policy option by monetary authorities.
I want to show that limiting myself to the contracts described in section 2.G. is without loss of generality. Note that the demand for cash in sub-period 3 by households is independent of the sunspot. Thus having the cash-for-next-period contracts not depend on the sunspot is without loss of generality. Since there is no private information between firms and banks, and since any contract offered by the firm can be obtained as a combination of the contracts that I describe, the claim is true for the those contracts.
Things are a little more complicated for the contracts that the bank offers the household, because the household type is private information. I want to show that allowing contracts such as (1, 0, 0), and (0, 1, 0), with γ = α in both cases cannot yield a better outcome than the one with the contract I have imposed. First note that assuming λ ≥ 1 is without loss of generality, since it can never be optimal for patient household to consume less goods than impatient households. Suppose that a household wants to buy a positive quantity of both the contracts described above. This contradicts the fact that λ has to maximize the utility of households. Thus I only have to consider the cases where only one of the above contracts is bought, together with the deposit contract. Suppose a household buys both the deposit contracts and the contract (0, 1, 0), with γ = α. This contract is worthless to the household if it is impatient, but it allows the household to purchase more goods if it is patient. An equivalent allocation could be obtained with deposit contract having a higher λ, so this contradicts the fact that λ maximizes the utility of households. Finally, suppose a household buys both the deposit contracts and the contract (1, 0, 0), with γ = α. The goods that the household obtains in this case will be consumed in sub-period one if the household is impatient, and stored until sub-period 2 if the household is patient. Again, this allocation could be obtained with a deposit contract having a lower λ, and this contradicts the fact that λ maximizes the utility of households. This completes the proof.
Proof of proposition 2:
I want to show that if µ = 0, the equilibrium allocation is efficient. Because competitive firms are indifferent between investing in the long-term or the short-term technology, and since they face the same production possibilities as the planner, it is enough to show that if µ = 0, the equilibrium prices give u (c 1 ) = Ru (c 2 ). Given the choice of utility function, this implies c 1 R 1 σ = c 2 . From the household problem, λp n c 1 = p n c 2 , or λc 1 = c 2 . Thus competitive banks will set λ = R 1 σ > 1.
